## Turkey PIC

### 1NC – Net Benefit – Cohesion – General

#### Turkey's recent collaboration with Russia undermines NATO cohesion

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Russia’s firm entrance to the Syrian conflict became a decisive point, initially leading to strains in ties with Ankara that ran high after Turkey had shot down a Russian aircraft. Moscow’s response consisted in boosting military involvement in the region and waging the trade war with Turkey, back then in favor of toppling the government of Bashar al-Assad. Six months passed since that moment, marking a sharp tilt in Turkish-Russian relations and prompting the two countries to forget about past resentments and start to cooperate. Ankara seeks to foster both an economic aspect of this partnership, including Russian trade outlets, tourists, Russian-sourced gas and building a nuclear power plant, and a common stance on Syria. Having no other choice to choose its partners in Syria’s war theater, Erdogan focused on bolstering cooperation with Moscow and Tehran under the Astana format. Ankara’s ties with Israel have dramatically deteriorated while those with the United States are getting worse and worse, given that the latter offers firm support to the Kurds, a useful ally in the war against the Islamic State in Syria. Also, Turkey has solidified cooperation with Qatar, hinting worse relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. But what makes matters worse is that this strikes a blow against NATO’s internal cohesion. Turkey has long made efforts to procure air defense missile systems; a few years later, the country had almost sealed the deal with China but had to resign amid pressure from Ankara’s Western allies. Having taken advantage of ever-closer cooperation with Putin, Erdogan inked an agreement to purchase Russian S-400s. Turkey and Russia signed in late 2017 an accord to supply Ankara with surface-to-air missile batteries, worth $2.5 billion. Since then, Washington had made several unsuccessful attempts to dissuade Turkey from acquiring Russian-made military hardware, also by offering at the end of 2018 to sell air defense systems Patriot for $3.5 billion. And Donald Trump is right when blaming the previous presidential administration for what is taking place now, with both Barack Obama and the then Congress having impeded the delivery of Patriots missiles to Ankara. This, along with Turkey’s ever-growing isolation in the West, played to the advantage of Moscow that cleverly ignited and co-created the conflict between Turkey on the one hand and the United States and NATO on the other.

### 1NC – Net Benefit – Cohesion – Laundry List

#### Inclusion of Turkey in NATO undermines democracy, human rights credibility, and NATO cohesion - kicking Turkey out is the only solution

Ben-Meir 17 [Dr. Alon Ben Meir is a professor and Retired Senior Fellow at New York University’s Center for Global Affairs and Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute; "Time to Kick Turkey Out of NATO?"; 11-9-2017; Globalist; https://www.theglobalist.com/turkey-erdogan-press-freedom-human-rights-nato-democracy/]//AShah

Turkey, as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has violated every provision of NATO’s founding treaty regarding human rights.

Indeed, each [member state is required](https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) to fully adhere to “…safeguard[ing] the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”

To be sure, Erdogan has given himself license to mock these principles without any noteworthy rebuke from other NATO members.

It is time to consider kicking Turkey out of NATO, regardless of how difficult and complicated this far-reaching measure may be. Turkey has long since forsaken Western values while becoming an increasingly zealous Islamic state.

Indeed, contrary to Erdogan’s manipulative narrative about Turkey’s presumed democracy, the country under his watch is governed by an authoritarian regime that has no place among Western democracies.

The violation of free press and the systematic undermining of human rights demands that the West reevaluate its relationship with Turkey and stop searching for excuses to justify its self-conceit about Erdogan’s outrageous behavior.

Erdogan’s violations

Here is a dossier of Erdogan’s gross violations of freedom of the press and his suppression of democratic values:

Turkey today has become the global leader of incarcerated journalists. The Stockholm Center for Freedom, a Sweden-based advocacy agency, [reports](http://stockholmcf.org/updated-list/?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) that as of July 2017 the Turkish government has arrested 228 journalists and convicted an additional twenty-five.

Reporters Without Borders’ 2017 World Press Freedom Index [ranks Turkey](https://rsf.org/en/ranking?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) 155 out of 180 countries.

President Erdogan has all but silenced any media outlets that have attempted any scrutiny of his policies, particularly his crackdown on anyone whom he perceives to be an enemy. As such, he has systematically denied the Turkish public any unbiased source of information from domestic newspapers, radio and television.

He uses the criminal justice system to prosecute journalists on [false charges](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/24/world/europe/turkey-trial-journalists-terrorism.html?_r=0&utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) of terrorism, insulting the president, or fabricated crimes against the state.

Many journalists have been [charged and convicted](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/world/europe/turkey-sentences-2-journalists-who-reported-on-arms-shipments-to-syrian-rebels.html?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) for reporting that the government is supplying weapons to the Islamic State (ISIS), when in fact [the government](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-arms/exclusive-turkish-intelligence-helped-ship-arms-to-syrian-islamist-rebel-areas-idUSKBN0O61L220150521?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) did just that, and [turned a blind eye](http://time.com/4132346/turkey-isis-oil/?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) to ISIS’ oil being smuggled into the country.

Pressuring media organizations

Erdogan regularly exerts tremendous pressure on various media organizations to dismiss journalists who write anything critical of the government, [such as](https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-prosecutors-accuse-newspaper-of-asymmetric-war-on-erdogan/3798464.html?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) those who worked for the newspaper Cumhuriyet.

Investigative journalism is viewed as treason against the state, which has de facto choked off any effort by journalists to investigate any wrongdoing by officials, especially in the rampant number of [corruption cases](http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/06/why-turkeys-mother-of-all-corruption-scandals-refuses-to-go-away/?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) that included several ministers and his own son.

He took over or closed down private media companies, [including](http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Turkey-seizes-control-of-another-news-agency-close-to-pro-Opposition-cleric-Gulen-447204?utm_source=subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-ua-5963141-2&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) Feza Publications (parent company of Zaman and Cihan), and in many cases assigned trustees to media organizations, which is absolutely illegal and against Turkey’s own constitution, which he labored so hard to pass.

Many of Turkey’s business tycoons, who have extensive media holdings, [are given](https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/12/15/silencing-turkeys-media/governments-deepening-assault-critical-journalism?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) major inner-city construction projects in exchange for keeping their reporters in check and forbidding them from publishing critical commentary about the government.

He regularly targets journalists and media outlets associated with the Gülen movement, which the government accuses of being a terrorist organization.

[Human Rights Watch reported](https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/15/turkey-silencing-media?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) that he closed nearly 170 media organizations and publishing outlets under the state emergency law that was enacted following the failed military coup in July 2016, severely undermining every aspect of human rights and the rule of law.

Targeting Kurdish journalists

Erdogan targeted Kurdish journalists in particular and pro-Kurdish political activists who have expressed support for Kurdish rights, including prominent academics and mayors, accusing them of having links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

In fact, none of the accused committed any wrongdoing—their arrests were arbitrary and lacked any semblance of legitimacy.

He stifled not only freedom of the press, but free speech in general. According to the Twitter Transparency Report, Erdogan demanded that Twitter remove any offending posts.

Of the 33,593 Twitter accounts [reported in 2016](https://transparency.twitter.com/en/removal-requests.html#removal-requests-jan-jun-2016), over 23,000 were reported by the Turkish government, more than all other countries put together.

Fearing retribution from the police, even private news outlets no longer dare to report on anything which is not to the liking of the government—including demonstrations or clashes related to the Kurdish problem.

Self-censorship by journalists has become a common practice, while quietening colleagues who try to protect the basic ethics of journalism.

Cracking down on demonstrations

Given that public demonstration is another form of free expression, Erdogan ensures that no demonstration can take place without a specific permit.

In 2015, a bill was [passed](https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2015/03/turkey-gives-police-broad-powers-to-repress-dissent/?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) allowing the police to use excessive force to quell demonstrations and incarcerate those who participate in unauthorized demonstrations for up to 48 hours, presumably to maintain public order.

[Protesters](http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/explained-turkeys-controversial-security-bill-78658?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) wearing full or even partial masks could face up to five years in prison, especially if they are accused of disseminating propaganda for terrorist organizations.

[Journalists are attacked](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/world/europe/turkey-press-erdogan-coup.html?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) for merely advocating for the resumption of peace talks with the PKK, or if they refer to PKK members as militants rather than terrorists. The Erdogan government has put freedom of the press under siege, and is bent on destroying journalism completely.

Erdogan’s crackdown not limited to Turkey

Erdogan’s crackdown on press freedom, however, is not limited to Turkish journalists and reporters; it has expanded beyond Turkey’s borders.

As a case in point, Turkish consular officials in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, [asked Turks](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/22/hear-someone-insult-erdogan-report-it-to-us-says-turkish-consulate-in-the-netherlands/?utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Subscribers&utm_term=.3f1e43585cfd) in the country to report on any insult directed against Erdogan.

Moreover, Turkey has targeted many foreign journalists, among them a French photojournalist who was [arrested and expelled,](https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2017/06/09/turkey-joint-call-for-journalist-mathias-depardons-immediate-release/?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) and another reporter for a [German television station](http://www.reuters.com/article/germany-turkey/turkey-denies-entry-to-german-journalist-at-istanbul-airport-idUSL5N17M3LZ?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) who was denied entry into the country.

Turkish state officials have accused European and Western media organizations of being hypocritical in their representation of the media in Turkey, as Western states have their own standards of censorship on sensitive matters related to national security.

Although on a couple of occasions the European Union issued scathing reports about Turkey’s serious backsliding on press freedom, the EU and the United States (along with the Council of Europe and the UN Human Rights Council) have unfortunately taken no punitive measures to stop Erdogan’s rampage against free press.

Sadly, the European community and the United States are betraying their democratic values. They continue to treat Erdogan with kid gloves because he is presumably an important player against ISIS, and because he is allowing the United States and its allies to use Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base to launch air attacks against ISIS.

To be sure, Erdogan has been successful in blackmailing the West. He skillfully uses his leverage to control the flow of Syrian refugees to Europe and cement Turkey’s geostrategic position as the hub for the transfer of oil and gas to Europe.

Turkey under Erdogan is not only violating freedom of the press, individual liberties, and the public’s right for peaceful demonstration; every stratum of Turkey’s governing authorities—including the police, the judiciary, the bureaucracy and the political echelon of the AK Party—is corrupt to the core and irredeemable.

Eroding NATO from within

NATO cannot allow one of its member states to erode the alliance from within and still expect it to be a viable force that can maintain and protect European security and its moral values.

No country led by a dictator that attacks U.S. allies—such as the Kurds in Syria—should remain a member of NATO, and no country that sold weapons to ISIS should be a member of NATO.

No country that cozies up to and [buys weapons](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/world/europe/turkey-russia-missile-deal.html?utm_source=Subscribers&utm_campaign=727bf6e08a-UA-5963141-2&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6e846e6217-727bf6e08a-310006173) from America’s enemy—Russia—should continue to be a member of NATO, and no country which is being transformed into an extremist Islamic state by a zealous leader should maintain its place as a member of NATO.

And no country that has violated every tenet of democracy, engages in gross human rights abuses and wreaks havoc on its population deserves to stay in the NATO alliance.

Turkey no longer a reliable partner

Turkey under Erdogan is no longer a reliable nor trustworthy partner, and has become a liability rather than a viable and constructive member of the organization, which could severely impact NATO’s cohesiveness, effectiveness and preparedness to meet any threat to European security.

For this reason, NATO should warn Erdogan that unless he reverses his policies and reinstitutes basic democratic principles, especially human rights and freedom of the press, Turkey will be kicked out of NATO.

Certainly, I am not holding my breath that NATO will act on this anytime soon, but I feel very strongly that a discussion on this critical issue within NATO should take place.

### 1NC – Net Benefit – Cohesion – Readiness

#### Turkey undermines NATO readiness and cohesion

Got 20 [Antoine Got is based in Europe and works on security and defense issues. He wrote for War on the Rocks, a platform for analysis and debate on strategy, defense, and foreign affairs; "Turkey’s Crisis with the West: How a New Low in Relations Risks Paralyzing NATO"; 11-19-2020; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato/]//AShah

NATO’s most important challenge today may not come from Russia, but from within. With the number of disputes between Turkey and several European allies yet again on the rise, the two parties’ souring relations have begun undermining the organization’s cohesion and ability to make timely collective decisions. If left unaddressed, these tensions could cause serious damage to the world’s most powerful alliance.

The latest flashpoint came from Turkey’s open backing of Azerbaijan’s war effort in the small landlocked enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which ended abruptly in early November thanks to a Russian-brokered deal. Reports of military assistance and alleged Syrian mercenaries sent by Turkey placed Ankara at loggerheads with its NATO allies’ calls for a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the conflict. The deal, which foresees Baku reacquiring sizeable portions of the disputed enclave, has made Turkey one of the obvious winners of the recent flare-up, while its Western allies remain on the sidelines. For some, this could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back, adding to a long list of complaints they have recently leveled against their NATO ally.

BECOME A MEMBER

Last month, Greece and Turkey came dangerously close to a head-on naval confrontation in disputed Eastern Mediterranean waters over Turkey’s gas exploration activities near the Greek island of Kastellorizo, just a few hundred meters away from the Turkish coast. Though Turkey later withdrew its ship, tensions between the two NATO allies spiked again following Turkey’s announcement that it would send the ship back for a 10-day seismic research mission in the area, renewing Greek calls for sanctions. What makes this a particularly explosive situation, of course, is the two Eastern Mediterranean powers’ lingering dispute over the post-1974 division of Cyprus and the discovery of energy resources in the area.

A similar confrontational encounter occurred in June when France and Turkey nearly came to blows after a French warship, the Courbet, tried to inspect a Turkish vessel for allegedly breaching a U.N. arms embargo on Libya — a claim Ankara fiercely denies. Supporting different sides in the Libyan Civil War, the two allies have been engaged in a war of words over each other’s provocative deeds in the Libyan, Syrian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts, as well as over Turkey’s territorial claims in the Mediterranean. The latest spat followed President Emmanuel Macron’s defense of a cartoonist’s right to caricature religious figures in the wake of a teacher’s beheading, to which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan responded by calling for a boycott of French products.

Within NATO, the escalation in tensions and growing entanglement of the two camps’ now numerous disputes reflects European allies’ mounting frustration over what they perceive as Turkey’s self-serving and aggressive regional posturing, and its unwillingness to consult allies before acting. A NATO member since 1952, Turkey has always occupied a somewhat unique role in the alliance. Its size, military resources, and key position at the doorstep of Asia — in other words, as NATO’s southern flank — give it important strategic relevance within the context of renewed interest in the Middle East. Though relations have often been fragile, especially since the 2016 coup attempt, the current rift marks a new low in the recent history of the alliance, with potentially damaging consequences. Given this backdrop, NATO should take advantage of its own resources to try to address its members’ deteriorating relations, and work to reconcile their diverging security interests. This is a lot easier said than done, but it may be the only option to prevent a more fundamental rupture in the relationship.

Divided We Stand

As tensions grow, a key risk for NATO relates to the crisis’ potential to hamper its cohesion and ability to act decisively, as the alliance relies on the principle of consensus to successfully operate. Every major NATO decision embodies the collective will of all allies and results, therefore, from a complex but fragile process of negotiation wherein nations are invited to compromise on matters of mutual interest. The inevitable drawback to this is that every ally possesses a de facto right to veto any NATO issue if its demands are not met, which they may be incentivized to use as leverage to pursue national interests. The same can be said of the European Union, which operates on unanimity and where Cyprus recently made headlines for blocking sanctions on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s regime, insisting on the imposition of E.U. measures on Turkey for its energy exploration in Mediterranean waters. The European Union was criticized for failing to agree on timely sanctions.

### 2NC – Net Benefit – Swinland

#### Turkey is a perennial spoiler - Erdogan is threatening to veto Swinland again

Slawson 7-20 [Darryl S. Slawson is passionate about the digital world, finance and trading has been one of his biggest hobbies. He is an expert in digital marketing and has been working on high quality content for EuropeWorldnews since October 2019; "Erdogan regrets that the Scandinavian countries have become "centres for the spawn of terrorist"."; 7-20-2022; Europe & World News; https://www.europeworldnews.com/erdogan-regrets-that-the-scandinavian-countries-have-become-centres-for-the-spawn-of-terrorism/]//AShah

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan lamented on Wednesday that the Scandinavian countries had become a “centre for the emergence of terrorism” and stressed that Ankara had “made clear its conditions” to Finland and Sweden to allow these countries to join NATO to perform .

“We made it clear,” he assured, before reiterating that Turkey’s terms include those countries ending the activities of terrorist organizations in their respective territories and allowing suspected terrorists to be deported to Turkey.

In this regard, he pointed out that Ankara “provided the list” of members of organizations such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the People’s Defense Units (YPG) and the FETO. Turkey is referring to the “Hizmet” movement of cleric Fetulá Gulen, whom it accuses of being behind the 2016 coup attempt. “You have to return them,” he said.

Erdogan regrets that the Scandinavian countries have become “centres for the spawn of terrorism”.

“They even nurture these terrorist organizations in their parliaments, like in a breeding center. If they do not keep their promises, it will not be possible for us to continue to positively approach the issue of these countries joining NATO,” he said.

Erdogan is again threatening to veto Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership

It has also been argued that “almost all Scandinavian countries have become centers of terrorism”, as have countries like Germany, France, the Netherlands, the UK and Italy. “The West currently has no right to speak on this matter,” he said.

During the NATO summit in Madrid at the end of June, Erdogan called on Finland and Sweden to “do their part” in the fight against terrorism and accused them of harboring terrorists.

#### Sweden and Finland inclusion in NATO solves impending Baltics conflict and enables a US pivot to Asia

Askonas 22 [Jonathan Askonas is an assistant professor of politics at the Catholic University of America and a fellow at its Center for the Study of Statesmanship and Gil Barndollar is a senior research fellow at the Catholic University of America’s Center for the Study of Statesmanship; "With Finland and Sweden in NATO, the U.S. Can Finally Pivot to the Pacific"; 7-12-2022; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/12/finland-sweden-nato-us-europe-pacific-military-pivot-strategy-geopolitics/]//AShah

Amid all of this “more,” both supporters and opponents of greater U.S. commitment to Europe have talked about possible Finnish and Swedish membership as if it was just another step in the alliance’s established process of expansion. But adding the two Nordic nations to the bloc could be an opportunity for far more: These countries could fundamentally transform NATO in ways that expand Washington’s global freedom of action. Whether the United States will seize this opportunity is another question.

Some [foreign-policy realists](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/case-against-finland-joining-nato-202542) and advocates of [U.S. restraint](https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/finland-sweden-joining-nato-us-safer) have opposed admitting Finland and Sweden to the alliance on the grounds that doing so would further extend the United States’ already unsustainable commitments to Europe and its potential conflicts. They are wrong: Adding Sweden and Finland will actually make it less likely that Americans will die fighting for these countries—and also reduce the odds that Americans will die for NATO’s likeliest flash point: the Baltic states.

Although Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are eager and serious NATO members, they are also uniquely [difficult to defend](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/02/nato-baltic-states-sea-russia-military-defense/), sandwiched between Russia, its ally Belarus, and Russia’s military exclave on the Baltic Sea, Kaliningrad. Military analysts have repeatedly identified the Baltic states’ defense as NATO’s preeminent military challenge. A [2016 Rand Corporation study](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html#:~:text=In%20a%20series%20of%20war,of%20its%20most%20exposed%20members.) found that Russian troops would enter the Estonian and Latvian capitals in 60 hours at most.

Swedish and Finnish NATO membership would transform the security challenge of the Baltics overnight. The Baltic Sea would immediately become a [NATO lake](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-06-30/nato-turkey-s-nod-to-finland-and-sweden-create-a-baltic-lake-to-buttress-east); any Russian hope for sea control would be gone, with the Swedish island of Gotland serving as an especially formidable barrier to Russian air and naval forces.

A strategically sound and cost-effective defense of the Baltic states should not pile NATO brigades into a salient that can easily be cut off and surrounded. Instead, it should rest on deterrence, which requires a credible commitment to a counteroffensive that would push back and destroy invading Russian forces.

Finnish and Swedish ground forces, though they would take time to mobilize, could be mustered and deployed far more quickly than Western European [armored brigades](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1629.html). They could also advance on a wholly new axis of attack: St. Petersburg, Russia, lies barely 110 miles from the Finnish border. Finnish and Swedish NATO membership would thus allow a resolute U.S. president to deny misguided Baltic requests for a forward-stationed U.S. garrison by pointing to a boost in conventional deterrence from NATO’s new members.

European NATO members’ free-riding—or getting their security on the cheap—has incensed U.S. presidents since [John F. Kennedy](https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/the-transatlantic-tussle-a-historical-case-study-on-how-to-handle-nato/). Only nine NATO members currently meet the alliance’s stated target of spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. In hard military terms, most NATO members aren’t war horses but [show ponies](https://blog.usni.org/posts/2021/03/17/an-alliances-four-quadrants).

That cannot be said of Finland and Sweden. Although Sweden has yet to reach the 2 percent threshold, both countries have [dramatically increased](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/10/sweden-announces-plan-for-significant-boost-in-military-spending) their [defense spending](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-04-05/finland-adds-2-2-billion-defense-spending-in-shadow-of-war) over the past decade. Should they join the alliance, Finland and Sweden would be immediate security contributors, not security consumers. This claim could not credibly be made for any new member since the end of the Cold War.

The Finns and Swedes are among the very few European militaries that boast both military quantity and quality. Unlike almost all of NATO, Finland and Sweden have military conscription, which provides both a huge trained reserve and a society [committed](https://www.dw.com/en/finland-wins-admirers-with-all-inclusive-approach-to-defense/a-40806163) to national defense. (Sweden restored conscription in 2018 after an eight-year hiatus.) The Finnish military has a wartime strength of 280,000 troops and a reserve of nearly 1 million people. A [2015 poll](https://web.archive.org/web/20180308220929/https:/www.gallup-international.bg/en/Publications/2015/220-WIN-Gallup-International%E2%80%99s-global-survey-shows-three-in-five-willing-to-fight-for-their-country) of 64 countries found that Finns were the most willing to defend their country of any European nation surveyed, with the Swedes not far behind. The Finnish and Swedish populations have skin in the game in a fundamental way, which could serve as a benchmark within NATO once the two countries are in the alliance.

Both countries also field cutting-edge equipment and capabilities. With [1,500 artillery and rocket systems](https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/what-would-finland-bring-to-the-table-for-nato/), Finland has one of Europe’s strongest artillery forces—a key to modern warfare, as the battle of attrition in Ukraine’s Donbas has again proved. Swedish fighter jets and diesel-electric submarines are some of the most advanced in the world. In December 2021, Finland announced it was ordering 64 U.S.-made F-35 fighter jets—relative to population, the equivalent of 3,840 F-35s for the United States.

Most importantly, Finland and Sweden are joining NATO for reasons of pure security—not, as in previous NATO expansion rounds, as an entrée into the trans-Atlantic community or validation of political reforms. Finnish and Swedish admission would strengthen NATO in hard-power terms and restore its role as a fundamentally military-focused alliance against an overriding security threat. It would mark a long-overdue return to NATO’s core and founding mission.

With the blunting of Russian conventional military power in Ukraine and Moscow’s generational task to resupply and modernize its shambolic military, it has become clear that European security can be an almost wholly European responsibility. Indeed, given the magnitude of China’s challenge in the Pacific and the United States’ [deteriorating position](https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/first-strike-chinas-missile-threat-to-u-s-bases-to-asia) there, European security urgently needs to be a European responsibility. Washington’s nuclear umbrella will remain, but the burden of conventional deterrence and warfighting in Europe should rest on European NATO members. Finnish and Swedish NATO membership can be a critical step toward making the alliance self-sufficient and opening a path to a responsible U.S. drawdown from the current U.S. military posture in Europe.

The addition of Finland and Sweden to the alliance could enable a major—if belated—U.S. strategic reorientation to the Pacific.

The European defense of Europe that Finland and Sweden make possible is the solution to the strategic dilemma the United States faces. Although there has been talk of transforming NATO into a looming contest with China—of which adding Beijing to the Strategic Concept is the latest manifestation—this effort is [doomed to fracture](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/nato%E2%80%99s-new-purpose-alliance-reborn-take-china-174488) along a thousand lines. The military structures are simply not in place for a two-theater effort, and there is no political will in Europe to be a junior partner in the United States’ struggle against China.

The latest, most violent phase of Russian revanchism has increased Europe’s perceived [security needs](https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/18/nato-sweden-finland-russia-balance-threat/). Despite Russia’s military struggles since February, the United States is facing increasing calls to defend Europe directly, especially in the Baltics. Doing so would require substantial resources: One study found the job could be done with [seven brigades](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html), one-fifth of the entire active-duty U.S. Army.

This is not just a problem of force structure or military spending. The commitment to bear the majority of the burden in opposing both the Russian and Chinese militaries prevents military doctrine, weapons acquisition, training, and many other aspects of defense from cohering around a single, specific strategic problem. At the height of the Cold War, it was the specificity of the Soviet threat as a [continental power](https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE301.html) that guided the U.S. Army and Air Force to create and implement the transformational AirLand Battle doctrine. China’s challenge to the United States is primarily naval and of an entirely different nature.

The Biden administration seems to hope that a pivot to Europe now will somehow later support a pivot back to Asia. On the same day that Finnish and Swedish accession moved forward after Turkish acquiescence, the White House announced the [deployment](https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3078087/biden-announces-changes-in-us-force-posture-in-europe/) of more U.S. troops to Europe and the construction of a new corps headquarters in Poland. There is probably less than meets the eye to these moves, but the additional destroyers to be home-ported in Spain and the F-35 fighters being stationed in Britain are exactly the kinds of weapons the Pacific theater demands. It’s an odd paradox: At the same moment that NATO’s European side is growing dramatically in size and readiness, the United States has chosen to do more in Europe, not less.

Since the end of the Cold War, despite browbeating and even [threats](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/22/trump-says-he-threatened-not-defend-nato-russia/), no U.S. president from any party has been able or willing to insist that Europe be defended primarily by Europeans. The addition of Finland and Sweden to the alliance could enable a major—if belated—U.S. strategic reorientation to the Pacific. The Madrid NATO summit indicated that this is currently unlikely. But it is not too late for a visionary U.S. administration to grasp the geopolitical opportunity offered by this unique moment for the trans-Atlantic alliance.

#### Turkey is messing with Swinland accession!

Haltiwanger ’22 [John; 7-19-2022; Senior politics reporter at Business Inside, BA in History from St. Mary's College of Maryland, MSc in International Relations from the University of Glasgow, “Right before meeting with Putin in Iran, Turkey's Erdogan threatens to 'freeze' Sweden and Finland's NATO membership,” Business Insider; <https://www.businessinsider.com/turkey-erdogan-threatens-to-freeze-sweden-finland-nato-membership-2022-7>] Accessed – 7/20/2022, WWIS

Erdogan on Monday once again threatened to derail Finland and Sweden's NATO ambitions.

Turkey has accused the Nordic countries of being too friendly with Kurdish groups it considers to be terrorists.

Erdogan's warning came a day before he met with Putin in Iran.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Monday once again threatened to stand in the way of Finland and Sweden joining NATO — a day before he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Iran.

"I would like to remind once again that if these countries do not take the necessary steps to fulfill our conditions, we will freeze the (accession) process," Erdogan said in a televised addressed, per the Associated Press. "Our stance on this issue is very clear. The rest is up to them."

Turkey has accused the Nordic countries of being too friendly with Kurdish militant groups it considers to be terrorists, while also taking issue with embargoes on arms exports. Along these lines, Turkey initially said it would block Finland and Sweden from joining the alliance. NATO enlargement requires unanimous agreement from all current members. But Turkey dropped its objections last month after coming to an agreement with Finland and Sweden.

"Turkey, Finland and Sweden have signed a memorandum that addresses Turkey's concerns, including around arms exports and the fight against terrorism," NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg said at the time.

After both Scandinavian countries submitted applications and Turkey said it was dropping its objections, NATO formally invited Finland and Sweden to join the alliance in late June. The next step in the process is for the legislatures of all 30 members to ratify Finland and Sweden's accession.

Finland and Sweden — two historically neutral or militarily non-aligned countries — moved to join NATO as a direct response to Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, marking one of the most significant consequences of Putin acting on his imperialistic ambitions. Indeed, Russia's war has unified the West in historic ways.

But autocratic leaders like Erdogan who hold sway in NATO — but tend to count Putin as a friend — have exposed cracks in that unity.

As he met with Putin and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in Iran on Tuesday, Erdogan once again zeroed in on Kurdish militant groups.

During a joint press conference with Raisi, the Turkish president said militias cause "great trouble" for both Iran and Turkey. "We should fight against these terrorist organisations in solidarity and alliance," he said, per the Moscow Times.

Turkey has been targeting Kurdish militants in Syria, where the Russian military exerts heavy influence, for years. The US and other Western countries have collaborated closely with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight against ISIS. This has increased tensions between Ankara and the West, and it's an issue at the heart of Erdogan's repeated threats to derail Finland and Sweden's NATO ambitions.

While in Iran, Erdogan was expected to urge Putin to permit grain exports from Ukraine in order to alleviate an escalating global food crisis catalyzed by Russia's blockade on Ukrainian ports. Ukraine, often characterized as Europe's breadbasket, is a major exporter of wheat, sunflower oil, and corn.

The EU has decried Russia's blockade on Ukrainian food exports as a "war crime," as experts warn that the Kremlin is deliberately attempting to provoke famine in poorer countries as part of its broader strategy to win its unprovoked war in Ukraine. The Kremlin has denied that it's at fault, blaming the situation on Ukraine and Western sanctions.

Last week, Istanbul served as the venue for talks between Ukrainian and Russian negotiators on grain exports from Ukraine. As they met in Tehran, Putin thanked Erdogan for his efforts to mediate the talks. "With your mediation, we have moved forward," Putin said to his Turkish counterpart, the Moscow Times reported. "Not all issues have yet been resolved, but the fact that there is movement is already good."

### 2NC – AT: Radars – Iran

#### The US can track Iranian missiles – we have satellites to cover the entire globe

Oberhaus ’20 [Daniel; 01/08/20; staff writer at WIRED; “How the US Knew Iranian Missiles Were Coming Before They Hit,” WIRED, <https://www.wired.com/story/us-missile-defense-iranian-strike/> smarx, AZG]

ON TUESDAY, IRAN launched more than a dozen missiles targeting two Iraqi military bases housing American soldiers. The attack was retaliation for the US drone strike that killed Qasem Soleimani, a top-ranking Iranian military general. In a televised speech on Wednesday, President Donald Trump said “minimal damage was sustained” during the attack and that no American or Iraqi lives were lost. Considering that Iran has developed missiles that are accurate to within a few tens of meters, it’s remarkable that all personnel at the base emerged unscathed.

According to Trump, this had nothing to do with luck or bad aim. Instead, he attributed it to “an early warning system that worked very well.” The US has a vast network of radars and satellites dedicated to tracking missile launches around the globe, which allowed troops stationed at the Iraqi bases to take cover before the missiles struck their targets. The system worked as intended, but as the missile technology of America’s adversaries continues to improve, some experts wonder if the country’s first line of defense will be able to keep up.

America’s missile warning system harkens back to the early days of the Cold War, when the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack kept the world on edge. By the early 1960s, the US had a network of a dozen ground-based radars concentrated around the Arctic and several infrared satellites capable of detecting the launches of Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles that could deliver a nuclear warhead to the US mainland. The ground-based radars would constantly send pulses of high-frequency radio waves toward the horizon; if a missile was launched, the radio waves would be reflected off the missile back to the radar antenna, while the satellites would search for heat signatures from the missiles.

Although the fundamental methods for detecting a missile launch haven’t changed all that much in the past 50 years, today’s missile warning systems are vastly more accurate and responsive. One of the biggest improvements in early warning technology has been seen in space systems, which keep a constant watch for missile launches across the entire globe. At present, the US has four missile-tracking infrared satellites in geosynchronous orbits—meaning they never change position relative to the surface of the Earth—and two additional infrared missile detection systems likely hosted on classified National Reconnaissance Office satellites. In the case of the Iranian attack, it was almost certainly one of these satellites that gave the military a heads-up that missiles were on their way.

“It must have been space-based or a manned aircraft,” says Riki Ellison, founder and chair of the nonprofit Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. “Radars are limited by the horizon and mountains so you won’t be able to detect a missile until it clears a certain elevation. You need something directly overhead.”

Once a satellite detects a possible missile launch, it triggers an alert at the Missile Warning Center, run by the US Space Command out of the Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station in Colorado. There, military analysts work to confirm that the detection is legit and process the trajectory of the missile to determine where it will strike. With this information in hand, Space Command can determine whether a missile intercept is possible or necessary. How long the whole process takes, from detection to direction, depends on the launch location and target. In the case of the Iranian attack, US officials say troops had hours of advance warning of an impending attack from communication and signals intelligence, but the warning after the missile launch was likely only a few minutes. No attempt was made to intercept the missile; instead, troops at the targeted bases were ordered to disperse.

The US missile warning system works great for ballistic missiles like those used by Iran, whose trajectories can be calculated with an extremely high degree of accuracy once they’re launched. It’s not well equipped to handle newer kinds of missiles. “What we’re seeing is the threats becoming more complex, and the complexity manifests in terms of maneuverability,” says Tom Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

More advanced missiles are able to change their trajectories mid-flight, which means “it won’t be in the place you think it’s going to be if you’re trying to engage it,” says Karako, who says maneuverable missile technology is within reach of Iran. Other US adversaries have still more advanced missiles like so-called “hypersonic glide vehicles” that take off like a normal missile and glide through the atmosphere at relatively low altitudes.

Defending against the combination requires the ability to continuously track a missile that is modifying its course and flying at relatively low altitudes. Right now that’s a sort of blind spot for the US early warning system. Radars are good at tracking objects well above the horizon, less so lower-flying hypersonic missiles, while satellites can detect a launch and calculate a trajectory, but not track an object during its flight (although two satellites currently in orbit are testing this capability).

The US Department of Defense is well aware of these shortcomings, and is making a concerted effort to update its technology. In 2018, the Air Force awarded Northrop Grumman an $866 million, five-year contract to upgrade three ground-based warning radar systems in the US. Last year, Congress approved a $160 million budget transfer to accelerate the development of a new generation of five missile-tracking satellites, the first of which is expected to launch in 2025.

Ellison says he also expects artificial intelligence to play a greater role in America’s missile warning system as the number of threats proliferates. “We’ve got to move faster, we can’t do the old school manual check out,” he says. Indeed, the US military is considering the use of machine learning to accelerate response times.

The Iranian missile attack was a grave reminder of the importance of a robust early warning system—its critical role in saving American and Iraqi lives may well have prevented the loss of countless others

#### New bipartisan legislation will pass to monitor Iranian missile threats – there’s growing congressional support

Abtar ’22 [Rana; 07/21/22; Masters in translation at the Saint Joseph University of Beirut; "US Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Track Iran Nuclear Efforts," Asharq Al-Awsat, <https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3770851/us-lawmakers-introduce-bill-track-iran-nuclear-efforts> //smarx, AZG]

Democratic and Republican lawmakers have introduced a bill requiring the US administration to assess Iranian threats and develop a clear strategy to deal with them.

The "Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability Monitoring Act of 2022" was presented by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez and Senator Lindsey Graham.

The act calls for establishing a task force to monitor Iran's nuclear weapons and missile capabilities and urges the Biden administration to coordinate intelligence cooperation with regional allies like Israel.

The bipartisan legislation requires that the Secretary of State submit an annual diplomatic strategy for engaging with partners and allies of the United States regarding Iran's nuclear weapons and missile activities.

The bill highlights the growing congressional opposition to the Biden administration's efforts to return to the nuclear deal with Tehran, including top Democratic members.

Menendez said there is no reason why the US Congress should not receive the most up-to-date information about Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile activities or the administration's diplomatic efforts to address the threats they posed.

Republican Senator Graham said that no matter what happens with the Iran nuclear negotiations, "we must monitor the Iranian nuclear program like a hawk."

### 2NC – AT: Radars – Israel

#### Israel will never attack Iran – too many political and military constraints

Safael ’21 [Sajjad; 09/17/21; postdoc fellow at Germany’s Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology; "Israel Isn’t Strong Enough to Attack Iran," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/17/israel-isnt-strong-enough-to-attack-iran/> smarx, AZG]

To be sure, Israel has in the past carried out relatively limited operations against Iran—such as raids on Iranian allies in Syria and nuclear sabotage—and may continue to do so in the future. But to what extent should we believe Tel Aviv is truly ready and willing to launch a strike on Iran because of advances in the Iranian nuclear program, knowing full well that this is likely to push the two countries and their allies into war? The political and military constraints on Israeli decision-makers suggests such a military showdown is highly unlikely.

To speak of an imminent and undisguised IDF strike deep inside Iranian territory is to overlook a long-established norm that has for decades governed U.S.-Israel relations: Israel cannot simply ignore the wishes and concerns of its chief patron, especially when core U.S. foreign policy priorities are at stake.

This norm was expressed in clear terms by no less a figure than Israel’s former premier and Defense Minister Ehud Barak in his autobiography My Country, My Life. Here, Barak spelled out the paradigm that has shaped—and will likely continue to shape—the contours of Israeli action against Iran. “There were only two ways,” he explained, that Israel could stop the Iranians from getting a nuclear weapon (read: “nuclear program,” for Barak willfully ignores U.S. intelligence assessments that Iran had halted pursuits for nuclear weapons in 2003). One way was “for the Americans to act.” The only other option was “for [the United States] not to hinder Israel from doing so.”

But according to Barak, “hinder” is precisely what consecutive U.S. administrations have done—and are still likely to do.

Even during the military interventionism of the George W. Bush presidency, Israel did not have a blank check to do as it pleased. As Barak notes in his memoirs, when Bush learned in 2008 of Israeli efforts to purchase heavy munitions from the United States, he confronted Barak and then-premier Ehud Olmert. “I want to tell both of you now, as president,” Bush warned, “We are totally against any action by you to mount an attack on the [Iranian] nuclear plants.”

“I repeat,” Bush further clarified, “in order to avoid any misunderstanding. We expect you not to do it. And we’re not going to do it, either, as long as I am president. I wanted it to be clear.” It deserves mention that according to Barak, Bush issued this warning despite knowing that Israel did not even possess the military capacity to assault Iran at the time.

According to Barak, this staunch opposition to a strike on Iran had a “dramatic” effect on him and Olmert since the Bush administration had supported Israel’s 2007 bombing of Syria’s nascent nuclear program just a year before. In both cases, Washington’s approval, or lack thereof, was demonstrably consequential.

Barak’s memoirs show that the same dynamic continued to govern U.S.-Israel relations during Obama’s presidency. He recalls how then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta “made no secret of the fact he didn’t want us to launch a military strike” at a time when the Obama administration was focused on putting international political and economic pressure on Iran. Panetta “urged me to ‘think twice, three times,’ before going down that road,” Barak wrote, and saw it as a given that Tel Aviv would keep Washington abreast of its decisions. “If you do decide to attack the Iranian facilities, when will we know?” he allegedly asked Barak.

According to Barak’s account, Israel was dissuaded from going forward with a supposed strike on Iran’s nuclear installations in summer 2012 “because of the damage it would do to our ties with the United States.” Washington’s demands continued to limit Tel Aviv after the finalization of the nuclear deal in 2015. Even then, Barak recalls, the Israelis could not simply act against Iran without a green light from the Obama administration: “We needed to reach agreement with the Americans about what kind of military strike we, or they, might have to take if the Iranians again moved to get nuclear weapons.”

As evinced by Barak’s autobiography, U.S. presidents are not taciturn about making their views and wishes known to Israeli officials, especially when primary U.S. foreign policy objectives are involved. Nor can Tel Aviv afford to ignore Washington’s express demands and concerns on such matters. And today, any flagrant Israeli violation of Iranian sovereignty will instantly clash with two mutually reinforcing goals that have come to define the Biden administration’s foreign policy: curbing Iran’s nuclear program through non-military means (efforts currently focused on reviving the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal) and winding down U.S. military presence in the Middle East.

These political realities make it unlikely Israel will pursue an overt strike on Iran. Just as important, however, are the military constraints that Israel faces.

To be sure, even without its ready-to-launch nuclear warheads, Israel is more than capable of delivering swift and devastating blows to Iran’s armed forces, both in the skies and seas. Its fleet of American fighter jets and bombers alone can irreparably trounce Iran’s air defenses as well as its dilapidated air force. Even Iran’s increasingly powerful, accurate, and far-reaching missile and drone systems don’t radically alter the balance of power in the skies. In short, in terms of military hardware, the IDF’s superiority over Iran’s armed forces is indisputable, not to mention otherworldly.

But this prodigious superiority will be rendered far less consequential in the event of an all-out war that lures the IDF ground forces into the battlefield. Why? Ever since the IDF’s embarrassing defeat during the 2006 war with Hezbollah, Israel’s top military brass have become acutely aware that the country’s land forces are ill-prepared for a full-scale war with a fighting force even moderately capable of packing a punch.

As shown by Israel’s own scathing inquiry into the 2006 war, as well as reports by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the U.S. Army, the 33-day war with Hezbollah demonstrated that the IDF ground forces had been woefully ill-prepared to fight a real war with a formidable foe.

Since then, there have been some signs of remedial measures undertaken by the IDF to address its shortcomings. Still, there is little reason to believe its ground forces have undergone a drastic improvement since the 2006 war. Unsurprisingly, when Gadi Eizenkot began his tenure as Chief of General Staff of the IDF a few months after Protective Edge (the 2014 Gaza War), he reportedly “found the ground forces in rather bad shape” and “an army that had gotten fat in … all the wrong places in the decade after the Second Lebanon War.” The picture looked more or less the same in late 2018 when the outgoing ombudsman of the Israeli Defense Ministry Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brick warned lawmakers in a “contentious” meeting that the country’s ground forces were unprepared for a future war.

Mindful of the gaping chink in the IDF’s armor, Israel’s highest military and political echelons are unlikely to order an overt military operation inside Iranian territory, knowing full well that such an assault will most likely lock Israel and Iran in an irreversible spiral of escalation that promises to pit ill-prepared IDF ground troops against Iranian forces and their regional allies such as Hezbollah.

But if Washington’s red light and Tel Aviv’s own military calculus render a flagrant violation of Iranian sovereignty by the IDF unlikely, then what is to account for the public, at times even garish, saber-rattling emanating from Israeli statesmen? Such threats are partly tailored for domestic consumption. In a highly militarized social context that has in recent decades steadily drifted toward the far-right, talk of bombing Iran may be an effort to not appear weak before one’s political rivals.

It may also be read, however, as a bargaining posture to strengthen Israel’s position vis-à-vis the Biden administration on issues far closer to home than the Iranian nuclear program. By continuously breathing life into the specter of striking Iran—a source of great unease in Western capitals due its catastrophic ramifications—Israeli leaders can offer to forgo their non-existent plans to enter an all-out war with Iran in return for other gains: Biden dropping his opposition to illegal settlement expansion in the occupied territories (a secondary issue for the United States) as well as more military and financial aid.